Fordham Law Review Online
Volume 91

Article 1

2022

The Presidential Succession Act at 75 | Opening Address
John D. Feerick
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flro
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the President/Executive
Department Commons

Recommended Citation
John D. Feerick, The Presidential Succession Act at 75 | Opening Address, 91 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (2022).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flro/vol91/iss1/1

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of
Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review Online by an authorized editor
of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

OPENING ADDRESS
John D. Feerick*
The program today is both unique and timely in its focus on presidential
line of succession scenarios. As you know, if a president were to die, resign,
or be removed after an impeachment trial, the vice president would become
president, as made clear by Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution’s Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, which codified historical precedents.1 Article II of the
Constitution provides that Congress may provide for the case of removal,
death, resignation, and inability of both a president and vice president.2
Congress exercised this power in Article II during the presidency of Harry
Truman. He signed into law on July 17, 1947, the Presidential Succession
Act,3 which is the subject of this program. Concerns have been raised about
the statute’s adequacy at this time in history, and proposals have been
advanced to change it. September 11, 2001, and the tragedies of that day,
and the January 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol are reminders of the
importance of having safeguards in place to deal with the unexpected.
November 22, 1963, set a precedent and benchmark as the country joined as
one upon the tragic death of President John F. Kennedy. From the time he
took the presidential oath of office in the executive chamber of an airplane
ninety minutes after the shooting, Vice President Lyndon Johnson made clear
that stability was essential and that it was not a time for uncertainty and
confusion.
I began my study of presidential succession a few years before this tragedy,
influenced by the several disabilities President Dwight Eisenhower
experienced in office. I threw myself into examining our executive
succession foundations as they then appeared in the Constitution. There was
hardly a month that went by when I did not spend time in the New York City
Public Library researching the succession arrangements from colonial
America and the early state constitutions that would have shaped the thinking
of the Framers of the Constitution when they met in Philadelphia in 1787. I
took some inspiration during this work from Cicero, who said, “if no use is
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1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
3. 3 U.S.C. § 19.
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made of the labors of past ages, the world must remain always in the infancy
of knowledge.”4
Suffice to say, as I detailed in the book I wrote at the time, From Failing
Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession, “[t]he necessity of having
someone available to act in the governor’s place should [the governor]
become ill, be absent from the colony, die in office, be removed, . . . or be
otherwise prevented from discharging his duties” was recognized throughout
our colonial experience.5 In Jamestown, executive power was placed in the
hands of an executive council.6 In the Virginia Charter of 1609, in the
Plymouth Colony, it was given to a governor assisted by an advisory
council.7 These developments subsequently were reflected in the charters
granted to Massachusetts and Connecticut, which created annually elective
officers of governor and deputy governor.8 In Dutch New York, governance
was provided for through the appointment of a director and vice director who
was to fill the director’s place “in the absence of the said Director” and was
“to perform all that a good and faithful Vice Director is bound to do.”9 The
Massachusetts Charter of 1691 gave expression to succession in the royal
colonies by providing for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor and
if the governor and lieutenant governor had died, resigned, or were absent,
and no one else was commissioned to act, the governor’s council was
empowered to administer the government or deputize someone to do so.10
“The history of the royal colonies is replete with examples of lieutenant
governors and councilors acting as governor when governors were absent
from the colony, resigned for reasons of health, were removed, or died in
office.”11
Unanticipated scenarios occurred and were dealt with
successfully. In 1701, for example, when the governor of New York died
and the lieutenant governor was absent from the colony and the eldest
member of the council was unavailable, the councilors on hand issued a
proclamation confirming all civil and military officers in their places, with
the oldest councilor then present presiding until the lieutenant governor or
the eldest councilor should arrive.12 “[O]f the one-hundred-thirty governors
whose service had ended before the beginning of the revolution, . . .
one-third[] died in office.”13 Not surprisingly, all of the early state
constitutions had executive succession provisions.14 The New York
gubernatorial line of succession ran from the lieutenant governor, who was

4. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
23 (1965).
5. Id. at 26.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 26–27.
8. See id. at 27–28.
9. Id. at 29.
10. See id. at 31–32.
11. Id. at 32.
12. See id. at 33.
13. Id. at 32.
14. See id. at 37.
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elected at the same time as the governor, to the president pro tempore of the
Senate, and then to the Speaker of the Assembly.15
The Framers, as noted, benefited from this 180-year history in crafting the
succession provision of Article II of the Constitution. With strengths,
weaknesses, and ambiguity of some of its wording, the provision has served
the nation reasonably well throughout American history. Some of the
ambiguities in the provision have been addressed by the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.16 Additionally, the power given to Congress to establish a
presidential line of succession has been exercised several times, each time
when the existing line of succession appeared in need of improvement. These
enactments and other approaches will be at the center of the program. Issues
as to the role of acting secretaries, how to handle the vacancies of president
and vice president, and dual inabilities of both officers are among the subjects
to be discussed by panels of scholars, former public servants, lawyers, and
educators.

15. See id. at 37–38.
16. See generally JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE
HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS (3d ed. 2014).

